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1.  Introduction 
  Over  the  last  several  decades,  migration  to  the  United  States  has  profoundly 
affected the Mexican economy.  The most obvious change has been to Mexico’s labor 
supply.  Between 1970 and 2000, the share of the Mexican population (individuals born 
in  Mexico)  residing  in  the  United  States  increased  from  1.7%  to  8.6%  (Figure  1).
1  
Emigration rates have been rising steadily over time and are highest for young adults.  
Between 1990 and 2000, 10.0% of males and 7.7% of females born in Mexico between 
1965 and 1974 migrated to the United States, raising the share of this age cohort living in 
the U.S. to 17.5% for males and 12.6% for females (Table 1). 
  Not surprisingly, the outmigration of labor appears to have put upward pressure 
on wages in Mexico.  Mishra (2004) estimates that in Mexico over the period 1970-2000 
the elasticity of wages with respect to the outflow of migrant labor was 0.4 and that 
emigration raised average wages in the country by 8.0%.  Upward pressure on wages has 
been strongest for young adults with above-average education levels (those with 9 to 15 
years of schooling), who in the 1990s were the individuals most likely to migrate to the 
United States (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005).  Increased labor flows between Mexico and 
the United States appear to be one factor contributing to labor-market integration between 
the two countries.  For the 1990s, Robertson (2000) finds that a shock that raises U.S. 
wages by 10% raises wages in Mexico by 1.8% to 2.5%. 
 Were  the  only  effect  of  emigration  to  raise  wages  for  migrants  and  for  non-
migrating workers who substitute for migrant labor, the labor outflow would yield static 
                                                 
1 In this calculation, the numerator is the population of individuals born in Mexico, as enumerated in the 
U.S. population census, and the denominator is the sum of this figure and the population of individuals 
born in Mexico, as enumerated in the Mexican population census.  This calculation ignores the small 
number of individuals born in Mexico who have migrated to third countries.   2 
welfare losses in Mexico.  However, an additional consequence of Mexican emigration 
has  been  an  increase  in  the  return  flow  of  remittances.    In  2003,  remittances  from 
Mexican immigrants in the United States equaled 2.0% of Mexican GDP (IADB, 2004).  
These appear to more than offset the loss in GDP due to emigration.
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   An  important  aspect  of  migrant  behavior  in  Mexico  is  that  the  propensity  to 
emigrate varies greatly across regions of the country.  Due partly to historical accident, 
central and western Mexico have long had the country’s highest labor flows abroad.  In 
Figure 2, which shows the fraction of households that sent migrants to the United States 
over 1995-2000 by Mexican state, emigration rates are relatively low in states along the 
U.S. border, sharply higher in states 600-1200 kilometers from the United States, and 
lowest in distant southern states.  Regional variation in migration behavior suggests that 
the  labor-market  consequences  of  migrant  outflows  may  be  concentrated  in  specific 
areas.  If this is true, estimates of the impact of emigration at the national level may 
understate its impact on the most affected regions.  While the importance of specific 
sending regions in Mexican migration to the United States has long been recognized 
(Cardoso,  1980),  there  is  relatively  little  empirical  work  that  assesses  the  regional 
economic effects of emigration in Mexico (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001). 
  In this paper I examine the regional impacts of emigration on labor supply and 
labor-market earnings in Mexico.  I compare changes in labor-market outcomes across 
individuals  between  1990  and  2000  in  two  groups  of  states,  states  that  had  high 
emigration rates in the 1950s and states that had low emigration rates in the 1950s.  There 
                                                 
2 Based on Mishra’s (2004) estimates, the emigration loss in Mexico for 2000 would be 0.45% of GDP (0.5 
times change in wages due to emigration of 8.0% times loss in labor supply due to emigration of 16.0% 
times labor share of income of 0.70).  In that year, remittances were 1.1% of Mexican GDP.  See Borjas 
(1999a) for estimates of the immigration surplus for the United States.     3 
are two key identifying assumptions in my analysis.  One is that labor is sufficiently 
immobile  across  Mexican  regions  for  region-specific  labor-supply  shocks  to  affect 
regional earnings differentials.  Robertson (2000), Chiquiar (2004), and Hanson (2004) 
provide  evidence  of  region-specific  labor-market  shocks  having  affected  Mexico’s 
regional  wage  structure,  which  is  consistent  with  some  degree  of  regional  labor 
immobility.  The second identifying assumption is that current opportunities to migrate to 
the United States depend on regional historical migration patterns.  One reason this may 
be  the  case  is  that  migration  networks  are  regionally  organized  and  historically 
dependent.  Munshi (2003) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2004) are recent contributions to 
a large literature that finds that in Mexico access to family or community networks helps 
migrants enter and succeed in the United States.
3 
  In  the  estimation,  I  use  migration  rates  in  the  1950s  as  a  reduced-form 
determinant of current migration opportunities.  Since high emigration in the past could 
have altered regions in a manner that affects current labor-market conditions, a reduced-
form approach is more appropriate than using past migration behavior as an instrument 
for current migration.  To control for internal migration, I use the 1950s emigration rate 
in  an  individual’s  birth  state,  rather  than  his  current  state  of  residence.    Historical 
migration rates in an individual’s birth state are thus meant to capture current access to 
migration networks, and so current opportunities to emigrate, in the Mexican regional 
labor market in which an individual is located.  The persistence in regional differences in 
migration behavior (Figure 3) is roughly consistent with my identifying assumptions. 
                                                 
3 An implicit third identifying assumption is that emigration incentives for Mexicans were stronger in the 
1990s than in previous decades, which in combination with the second assumption would imply that any 
negative labor supply shock associated with emigration would be larger in states with a longer history of 
U.S. migration.  Data presented in section 3 are consistent with this assumption.     4 
  The challenges to identifying the regional consequences of emigration in Mexico 
are analogous to those in identifying the regional consequences of immigration in the 
United States.  Many studies have found that across U.S. cities and states immigrant 
inflows  are  only  weakly  negatively  correlated  with  wage  changes  for  U.S.  native 
workers, suggesting that immigration has had little impact on the U.S. wage structure (see 
LaLonde  and  Topel,  1997;  Smith  and  Edmonston,  1997;  Borjas,  1999;  Card;  2001).  
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) argue that cross-area wage regressions of this type 
identify  the  wage  impact  of  immigration  only  under  restrictive  assumptions.    The 
tendency for immigrants to settle in regions with high wage growth makes estimates of 
the immigration wage impact based on cross-area regressions susceptible to upward bias.  
The  standard  practice  of  using  the  preceding  decade’s  regional  immigrant  stock  to 
instrument for current regional immigrant inflows may not be valid if regional labor-
market shocks persist over time.  Borjas (2003) examines age and education cohorts at 
the national level and finds larger wage effects from immigration.  He estimates that over 
1980-2000 the elasticity of U.S. native wages with respect to immigrant inflows was 0.3-
0.4 and that immigration contributed to a decrease in U.S. average wages of 3%. 
  Similar  to  the  cross-area  regression  approach,  I  distinguish  between  Mexican 
states based on historical migration behavior.  However, distinct from this approach I am 
able  to  use  much  longer  lags  on  regional  migration  rates  and  to  measure  historical 
migration rates in an individual’s birth state.  These features help address the concerns 
that (i) regional labor-market shocks may persist for more than a decade, and (ii) an 
individual’s  current  state  of  residence  may  be  affected  by  current  regional  migration   5 
rates.  The assumptions underlying my approach are thus perhaps less restrictive than 
those underlying the standard cross-area approach in literature on U.S. immigration. 
  An obvious challenge for the estimation is that there may be other, unobserved 
differences between high and low migration states that may affect current labor-market 
outcomes.    By  examining  regional  differences  in  changes  in  outcomes,  rather  than 
regional differences in outcome levels, I am able to control for time-invariant region-
specific characteristics.  Still, there may have been other shocks in the 1990s that had 
differential effects on regions with high versus low opportunities to migrate to the United 
States.    Candidate  shocks  include  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement,  the 
privation and deregulation of industry, the reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system, and 
the 1994-1995 peso crisis.
4  The potential for these shocks to contaminate the analysis is 
an important concern, which I address in discussing qualifications to my results. 
  In  the  next  section,  I  document  further  how  migration  behavior  varies  across 
regions of Mexico and discuss the criterion I use for selecting which Mexican states to 
include in my sample.  In section 3, I describe how changes in labor supply vary across 
high and low-migration states in Mexico and compare mean earnings and the distribution 
of earnings in high and low-migration states.  In section 4, I use standard parametric 
techniques and non-parametric techniques developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
(1996) and Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, and McCrary (2004) to examine how earnings have 
changed over time in high and low migration states.  By wage of conclusion in section 5, 
I discuss limitations of the estimation strategy and ideas for extending the analysis. 
                                                 
4 See Chiquiar (2003) on recent policy changes in Mexico.  For work on the labor-market implications of 
globalization in Mexico, see Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Revenga (1997), 
Hanson and Harrison (1999), Robertson (2000, 2004), Feliciano (2001), Farris (2003), Ariola and Juhn 
(2003), Chiquiar (2004), and Hanson (2004).   6 
 
2.  Regional Patterns of Emigration in Mexico 
2.1  Data Sources 
  Data for the analysis come from two Mexican sources.  In 1990, I use the 1% 
microsample of the XII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 1990, and in 2000 I use 
a 10% random sample of the 10% microsample of the XIII Censo General de Poblacion y 
Vivienda, 2000.  Unfortunately, the 1990 census contains no information about household 
emigration behavior.  The 2000 census includes two questions related to emigration:  (i) 
whether anyone from the household migrated to the United States (or another foreign 
country) in the last five years (and the number, age, and gender of these individuals), and 
(ii) whether anyone in the household received income in the previous month in the form 
of remittances from migrants located abroad (and the quantity received).  These questions 
have obvious shortcomings.  They provide no indication of the education of migrants, 
return or round-trip migration, migration before 1995, annual receipts of remittances, or 
transfers from migrants in kind rather than in cash.  Still, the 2000 census is useful in that 
it  is  the  only  nationally  representative  sample  available  for  Mexico  that  contains 
information about migration to the United States. 
  For data on historical migration patterns, I use estimates of state emigration rates 
from Woodruff and Zenteno (2001).  They calculate the fraction of each Mexican state’s 
population  that  migrated  to  the  United  States  over  1955-59  by  combining  data  on 
Mexican  state  populations  with  data  on  annual  U.S.  immigration  of  temporary  legal 
workers  from  each  Mexican  state  under  the  U.S.  Bracero  Program.    The  Bracero 
Program, which lasted from 1942 to 1965, allowed U.S. employers to import workers 
from Mexico (and the Caribbean) to fulfill short-term labor contracts.  Most braceros   7 
worked in agriculture (Calavita, 1992).  Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) also provide data 
on state emigration rates in 1924, which I use in some empirical exercises. 
  For the analysis of earnings, I focus on men, since their labor-force participation 
rates are relatively stable over time, rising modestly from 73% in 1990 to 74% in 2000 
(and are quite similar in high and low migration states).  Labor-force participation rates 
for women are low and variable over time, rising from 21% in 1990 to 32% in 2000.  For 
women, this creates issues of sample selection associated with who supplies labor outside 
the home that complicates examining changes in the distribution of earnings. 
 
2.2  Regional Patterns in Mexican Migration to the United States 
  Large scale migration from Mexico to the United States began in the early 20
th 
century.  The construction of railroads in the late 19
th century linked interior Mexico to 
the U.S.-Mexico border, which gave U.S. employers improved access to Mexico labor 
(Cardoso, 1980).  In the early 1900s, growers in Texas began to recruit farm laborers in 
Mexico.    At  the  time,  the  population  on  the  Texas-Mexico  border  was  small  and 
dispersed.  To find workers, recruiters followed the main rail line into Mexico, which ran 
southwest through relatively densely populated states in the west-central region of the 
country.  Early migrants came primarily from nine states in this region (Durand, Massey, 
and Zenteno, 2001).
5  The recruitment efforts of U.S. employers intensified in the 1920s, 
after  the  U.S.  Congress  imposed  stringent  quotas  on  U.S.  legal  immigration,  which 
sharply  reduced  immigration  of  low-skilled  labor  from  southern  and  eastern  Europe.  
Recruitment intensified further in the 1940s, after Congress passed legislation allowing 
                                                 
5 These nine states are Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San 
Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas.   8 
large-scale  temporary  legal  immigration  from  Mexico  under  the  Bracero  Program 
(Calavita, 1992).  From the 1920s to the 1960s, the nine west-central states accounted for 
44.0% to 56.1% of Mexican migration to the United States (but only 27.1% to 31.5% of 
Mexico’s total population) (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001).   
  After working in the United States, many migrants return to Mexico where they 
often assist later generations in emigrating.  Migrants remaining in the United States have 
created home-town associations that help members of their communities in Mexico make 
the  transition  to  living  north  of  the  border  (Cano,  2004).    In  addition  to  home-town 
associations, there appear to be many informal networks through which current migrants 
help prospective migrants enter the United States, find housing in U.S. cities, and obtain 
jobs with U.S. employers.  These networks are often embedded in relationships involving 
family, kin, or community of birth, which gives them a strong regional component.  Of 
218 home-town associations formed by Mexican immigrants enumerated in 2002 survey 
of such organizations in southern California, 86.6% were associated with one of the nine 
west-central states (Cano, 2004).  Networks appear to be important for migrant outcomes 
in the receiving country.  Munshi (2003) finds that Mexican immigrants in the United 
States are more likely to be employed the larger is the U.S. population of residents from 
their  home  community  in  Mexico  (where  he  instruments  for  the  size  of  the  home-
community  population  using  time-series  data  on  regional  rainfall  in  Mexico).    The 
importance  of  migrant  networks  for  migration  behavior  and  their  strong  regional 
character may help explain regional persistence in migration patterns. 
  Figure  3  provides  graphical  evidence  of  persistence  in  regional  migration 
behavior.  The states that had high migration rates in the 1950s, during the height of the   9 
Bracero Program, continue to be high migration states.  The correlation between state 
emigration  rates  in  the  1995-2000  and  the  1955-59  periods  is  0.73.    The  correlation 
between state migration rates in the 1995-2000 and 1924 periods is 0.48.   
  As Figure 2 illustrates, high migration states are not those closest to the United 
States.  Nor does income appear to be the sole determinant of emigration.  Table 2 reports 
regressions  of  state  emigration  rates  in  1995-2000  on  income  and  other  state 
characteristics.  In column 1, there is a negative correlation between state emigration 
rates and state per capita GDP, but the explanatory power of income isn’t all that high.  In 
column 2, adding distance to the United States (and distance squared) more than doubles 
the R-squared of the regression.  The relation between emigration and proximity to the 
U.S. is nonlinear, with emigration initially rising with distance (reflecting low emigration 
in states on the U.S. border) and then declining with distance (reflecting high emigration 
for central states and low emigration for distant southern states).  In column 3, adding the 
state  emigration  rate  in  1924  as  an  independent  variable  raises  the  R-squared  of  the 
regression from 0.25 to 0.46.  However, there appears to be little covariation between the 
1995-2000 and 1924 emigration rates that is independent of the 1950s emigration rate.  In 
column 4, once the 1955-59 emigration rate is added the R-squared rises further to 0.67 
and  the  1924  migration  rate  becomes  statistically  insignificant,  reflecting  the  strong 
historical persistence in state emigration patterns.  Columns 5-8 repeat the exercise using 
the fraction of households in 2000 receiving remittances from migrants abroad as the 
dependent variable, with similar results. 
  If states with relatively high emigration rates are also states that are more exposed 
to other aspects of globalization, then the empirical analysis might confound the effects   10 
of emigration with the effects of trade or capital flows.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Mexican  government  lowered  barriers  to  international  trade  and  foreign  investment.  
Chiquiar (2004) and Hanson (2004) find that since 1985 Mexican states more engaged in 
international trade have enjoyed  faster  growth  in average income and  labor earnings.  
However, high emigration states do not appear to have benefited disproportionately from 
trade and investment reform.  As expected, trade liberalization has affected states on the 
U.S.-Mexico border most strongly, and, as Figure 2 shows, border states are not high 
emigration states.  Most high emigration states appear to have relatively low exposure to 
foreign trade and investment.  This is seen in Figures 4 and 5, which plot the fraction of 
the state population migrating to the United States over 1995-2000 against the share of 
foreign direct investment in state GDP and the share of imports in state GDP.  Table 3 
shows  that  across  Mexico  states  in  the  1990s  emigration  rates  are  weakly  negatively 
correlated with exposure to trade and foreign investment.  It appears high exposure to 
emigration is not associated with high exposure to globalization.  I discuss variation in 
state exposure to these and other shocks again in Section 5. 
 
2.3  Sample Design 
  The goal of this paper is to examine the regional labor-market consequences of 
emigration in Mexico.  One approach would be to utilize data on migration to the United 
States in Mexico’s 2000 population census.  Using the 2000 data, I could compare labor-
market  outcomes  in  households  with  emigrants  to  outcomes  in  households  without 
emigrants.    Or,  combining  the  household  cross-sections  in  1990  and  2000,  I  could 
examine the covariation between the 1990-2000 change in household outcomes with the 
1995-2000 state emigration rate.  The obvious concern with either of these approaches is   11 
that  household  migration  behavior  is  endogenous.    The  unobserved  characteristics  of 
households that affect their earnings and labor supply are also likely to affect whether 
households send migrants to the United States. 
  One  way  to  address  the  endogeneity  problem  would  be  to  use  historical  state 
emigration  rates  as  an  instrument  for  current  opportunities  to  migrate  abroad.    The 
discussion in section 2.2 suggests that the 1950s emigration rate in an individual’s birth 
state would be a good indicator of an individual’s access to migration networks and so of 
an individual’s relative opportunity to migrate to the United States.  Using data from the 
2000 census, unreported probit regressions show that the likelihood a household either 
has sent a migrant to the United States in the last five years or has received remittances 
from  abroad  in  the  last  month  is  strongly  positively  correlated  with  the  1955-59 
emigration rate in the household head’s birth state.
6 
  However, historical state emigration rates are unlikely to be a valid instrument for 
current migration rates.  Emigration opportunities in an individual’s birth state may have 
affected  an  individual’s  accumulation  of  human  capital,  either  by  influencing  the 
individual’s  early  employment  prospects  (if  local  emigration  rates  affect  local  wage 
levels) or the quality of education the individual received as a youth (if remittances or 
local income levels affect the quality of local schools).  Past emigration opportunities are 
thus likely to affect current labor-market outcomes both directly, through their impact on 
                                                 
6  Additional  controls  in  this  regression  are  a  cubic  in  age  of  the  household  head,  dummies  for  the 
educational attainment of the household head, the sex of the household head, and dummy variables for the 
state of residence.  Evaluated at mean values for the other regressors, individuals born in high-migration 
states are 24.3% more likely to have had someone in their household migrate to the United States in the last 
five years and 21.7% more likely to have received remittances from migrants located abroad in the last 
month (with both of these effects very precisely estimated).   12 
current emigration opportunities, and indirectly, through their impact on an individual’s 
stock of human capital (which is only partially observed). 
  Given these concerns, I take a reduced-form approach by comparing changes in 
cross-section  labor-market  outcomes,  where  I  categorize  individuals  according  to  the 
emigration rate in their birth state.  In so doing, I capture both the direct and indirect 
effects  of  historical  emigration  opportunities  on  current  labor-market  outcomes.    In 
presenting  the  empirical  results,  I  will  discuss  whether  the  reduced-form  effect  of 
historical emigration rates on labor-market outcomes is likely to under or over-state the 
effect attributable solely to current emigration opportunities. 
  My empirical strategy is thus to compare labor-market outcomes in regions that 
have been more or less exposed to opportunities to migrate to the United States.  Table 4 
describes the sample of states.  I drop the six border states from the sample, since these 
states have benefited disproportionately from trade and investment liberalization.  Most 
border states had above average emigration rates in the 1950s and including them in the 
sample  could  confound  the  effects  of  emigration  with  those  of  other  aspects  of 
globalization.  To help isolate the effects of emigration, I limit high-migration states to 
those  with  emigration  rates  in  the  top  three  deciles  of  non-border  states  and  low-
migration states to those with emigration rates in the bottom three deciles of non-border 
states.    In  2000,  10.4%  of  households  in  the  seven  high-migration  states  had  sent  a 
migrant to the United States in the previous five years, compared with only 2.1% of 
households in the seven low-migration states.   
  With  the  exception  of  the  Federal  District,  in  which  part  of  Mexico  City  is 
located, all the low-migration states are in southern Mexico.  Per capita income in the   13 
Federal District is over three times that in the southern low-migration states.  And, as 
Figures 4 and 5 show, the Federal District has much higher exposure to international 
trade than the southern low-migration states.  There is also heterogeneity among high-
migration  states.    Jalisco,  in  which  Guadalajara  (the  country’s  second  largest  city)  is 
located, has high relatively high exposure to international trade.  By way of checking the 
robustness of the results, I will perform the analysis with and without individuals born in 
the Federal District or Jalisco included in the sample.   
 
3.  Preliminary Analysis 
3.1  Population Changes in High and Low Migration States 
  The most direct effect of emigration has been to reduce the relative population of 
young adults born in high-migration states.  Figures 6 and 7 show cohort sizes based on 
age in 2000 for males and females born in high-migration or low-migration states.  In the 
absence of measurement error, changes in population size are due to either net migration 
abroad or to death.  Cohort sizes decline for all age-sex groups, except 10-19 year olds.
7  
Population declines are  largest for 20-29  year-old men (men born between 1971 and 
1980) from high-migration states, whose number declines by 33.4 log points.  In low-
migration states, the number of 20-29 year-old men drops by only 9.4 log points, such 
that the relative decline of the 20-29 year-old male population in high-migration states 
over  1990-2000  is  24.0  log  points.    Overall,  the  population  of  20-59  year-old  men 
declines by 9.8 log points in high-migration relative to low-migration states.
8     
                                                 
7 One explanation for the increases in cohort size for 10-19 year olds is greater measurement error in the 
1990 census (in which case Figures 7 and 8 may understate reductions in cohort sizes over the decade). 
8 One might imagine that internal migration in Mexico could have partly reversed the change in relative 
regional labor supplies due to emigration.  The large exodus of individuals born in high-migration states 
might have given individuals from other states an incentive to move in.  But data on population by state of   14 
  Absolute and relative changes in female cohorts are smaller.  The cohort of 20-29 
year-old women declines by 16.8 log points in high-migration states and 2.0 log points in 
low-migration states.  Overall, the population of 20-59 year-old women declines by 8.4 
log points in high-migration relative to log-migration states.
9  Figure 8 shows that as a 
result of higher emigration rates for males, the share of men in the population of 20-29 
year olds from high-migration states falls from 49% to 45% during the 1990s.  In low-
migration states the change is more modest, with a drop of 50% to 48%. 
  It appears men and women born in high-migration states in Mexico have become 
more likely to migrate abroad.  One might also wonder whether they have become more 
likely to migrate internally.  Table 5 reports probit regressions using data from 1990 and 
2000  on  whether  individuals  born  in  high-migration  or  low-migration  states  have 
changed their state of residence since birth.  The regressors are (a) a cubic in age, dummy 
variables for five categories of educational attainment (1-5 years, 6-8 years, 9-11 years, 
12-15  years,  16+  years),  a  dummy  variable  for  marital  status,  dummy  variables  for 
presence of children in the household (ages 0-5, 6-12, 13-18), dummy variables for the 
state  of  birth,  and  a  dummy  variable  for  2000;  (b)  interactions  between  the  age, 
education,  marital  status,  and  children  variables  and  the  year  2000  dummy;  (c) 
interactions  between  the  age,  education,  marital  status,  and  children  variables  and  a 
dummy variable for whether the individual was born in a high-migration state; and (d) the 
interaction between the year 2000 dummy and the dummy for whether an individual was 
born in a high-migration state.  I report results only for this last variable, which captures 
                                                                                                                                                 
residence (rather than state of birth) suggest that this is not the case.  During the 1990s, high-migration 
states experienced the largest net decrease in resident population, followed by low-migration states.  Border 
states had the largest net increase in resident population. 
9 Dropping the Federal District and Jalisco, the relative population of 20-59 year olds in high-migration 
states declines by 9.4 log points for men and 7.3 log points for women.   15 
the change in the likelihood of having migrated internally over 1990-2000 for individuals 
born in a high-migration state relative to those born in a low-migration state. 
  Between  1990  and  2000,  men  from  high-migration  states  become  3.4%  more 
likely to live in a state different than their birth state, relative to men from low-migration 
states.  Excluding the Federal District and Jalisco the estimate falls to 1.6%.  Between 
1990 and 2000, women from high-migration states become 4.1% more likely to live in a 
state  different  than  their  birth  state,  relative  to  women  from  low-migration  states.  
Dropping  the  Federal  District  and  Jalisco  the  estimate  falls  to  2.1%  (and  remains 
precisely estimated).  It appears that during the 1990s individuals from high-migration 
states have become more likely to migrate either externally or internally. 
 
3.2  Education and Earnings in High and Low Migration States 
  The educational profile of individuals by birth state varies between high- and low-
migration states.  Table 6 shows the distribution of schooling by age cohort in 2000 for 
the sample of Mexican states.  For men, average schooling is higher in low-migration 
states.  Among 30-39 year-old men in 2000, 62.6% had completed nine or more years of 
schooling in low-migration states, versus 47.7% in high-migration states.  For women, 
these figures are 57.5% and 42.7%, respectively.  These differences, however, depend on 
including among low-migration sates the Federal District, which has the most educated 
work force in the country.  Once the Federal District and Jalisco are dropped from the 
sample,  educational  attainment  is  relatively  similar  in  the  two  groups  of  states,  with 
46.9% of men and 40.1% of women in the 30-39 age cohort having completed nine or 
more years of education in low-migration states and 45.9% of men and 40.6% of women 
in the 30-39 age cohort doing so in high-migration states.   16 
  Despite  comparable  or  higher  education  levels  in  low-migration  states,  wages 
appear to be higher in high-migration states.  Table 7 shows average hourly wages by age 
and schooling cohort in 1990 and 2000.
10  For the full sample of states, wages are higher 
in high-migration states for most cohorts in 1990 and for all cohorts in 2000.  In 1990, for 
men  with  6-8  years  of  education,  which  spans  mean  schooling  levels  in  either  year, 
average hourly wages are $0.06 to $0.44 higher in high-migration states, depending on 
the age cohort (based on age in 2000).  In 2000, these wage differentials widen to $0.25 
to $0.74.   Wages in high-migration states increase relative to wages in low-migration 
states in 15 of the 18 age-schooling cohorts.  Dropping the Federal District and Jalisco, 
wages remain higher in high-migration states in most cohorts for both years. 
  Figure  9,  which  shows  kernel  densities  for  log  average  hourly  wages,  gives 
another perspective on wages in high and low-migration states.  In 1990, wages have 
lower dispersion and  a  higher mean in high-migration states when  compared to low-
migration  states.    In  2000,  these  features  are  more  pronounced.    Relative  to  high-
migration states, wages in low-migration states show an increase in relative dispersion 
and  in  relative  mass  in  the  lower  tail.    In  Figure  10,  which  shows  wage  densities 
excluding  the  Federal  District  and  Jalisco,  the  relative  rightward  shift  in  the  wage 
distribution for high-migration is more evident. 
  Both in terms of average wages and wage densities, it appears that unconditional 
wages in high-migration states are higher than those in low-migration states and that this 
differential increases over the 1990s.  This is seen clearly in Figure 11, which shows the 
                                                 
10 Average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income/(4.5*hours worked last week).  I need to assume 
individuals work all weeks of a month, which could bias wage estimates downwards.  To avoid measurement error 
associated with implausibly low wage values or with top coding of earnings, I restrict the sample to be individuals with 
hourly wages between $0.05 and $20 in Mexico (in 2000 U.S. dollars).  This restriction is nearly identical to dropping 
the largest and smallest 0.5% of wage values.   17 
double difference in wage densities for high-migration and low-migration states (i.e., the 
2000 difference in wage densities for high-migration and low-migration states minus the 
1990 difference in wage densities).  Relative to low-migration states, over time high-
migration states gain mass in the upper half of the wage distribution.   
 
4.  Decomposing Changes in Earnings 
  During the 1990s, the earnings gap appeared to increase between men born in 
high-migration states and men born in low-migration states.  At face value, this change is 
difficult  to  interpret.    It  is  possible  that  the  large  exodus  of  individuals  from  high-
migration states may have increased the wages of non-migrating individuals from these 
states relative to wages for non-migrating individuals from low-migration states.  In this 
case, the national wage changes associated with emigration reported by Mishra (2004) 
would also be evident at the regional level. 
  However,  other  interpretations  of  the  observed  wage  changes  are  plausible.  
Borjas  (1987)  suggests  that  in  countries  with  high  skill  premia  and  high  earnings 
inequality, such as Mexico, the less-skilled are likely to have the highest propensity to 
migrate to countries with low skill premia and low earnings inequality, such as the U.S.  
In Mexico, if low-skill, low-wage individuals are more likely to migrate abroad (migrants 
are negatively selected in terms of skill), the apparent increase in wages in high-migration 
states may be due partly to shifts in labor-force composition.  
  To  describe  wages  changes  in  high-migration  and  low-migration  states  more 
thoroughly,  I  apply  non-parametric  techniques  for  constructing  counterfactual  wage 
densities developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, 
and  McCrary  (2004).    In  the  first  exercise,  I  compare  the  1990-2000  change  in  the   18 
distribution of earnings between high-migration and low-migration states, holding the 
returns to observable characteristics constant.  By fixing the returns to characteristics but 
allowing the distribution of characteristics to vary over time and across regions, I isolate 
how regional differences in the composition of the labor force have changed.  This will 
help reveal whether it is low-wage or high-wage individuals from high-migration states 
who are more likely to migrate abroad.  In the second exercise, I compare the 1990-2000 
change in the distribution of earnings between high-migration and low-migration states, 
holding the distribution of individual characteristics constant.  By fixing the distribution 
of characteristics, but allowing the returns to characteristics to vary, I examine whether 
non-migrating individuals in high-migration states have enjoyed wage gains relative to 
non-migrating individuals in low-migration states.
11 
  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  neither  non-parametric  exercise  I  perform 
amounts to a truly valid counterfactual.  This is because emigration is likely to have 
changed  both  the  distribution  of  worker  characteristics  and  the  returns  to  these 
characteristics.  By looking at each change in isolation, the counterfactual differences in 
wage densities I construct represent only partial decompositions of the change in the 
wage  distribution.
12    Nevertheless,  the  non-parametric  analysis  will  be  helpful  for 
assessing the plausibility of the parametric results. 
  Following the non-parametric estimation, I consider a parametric regression of 
differential  wage  changes  in  high-migration  and  low-migration  states  on  differential 
emigration opportunities (as summarized by historical emigration rates).  The parametric 
                                                 
11 DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux is not the only approach to non-parametrically decompose changes in wage 
distributions.  See Machado and Mata (2005) (and Autor and Katz, 2004) for an alternative methodology. 
12 A complete decomposition would separate wage changes into components due to changes in returns for 
given characteristics, changes in characteristics for given returns, and the interaction of changes in returns 
and changes in characteristics.  The non-parametric analysis in effect ignores the third component.   19 
approach  will  provide  an  estimate  of  the  differential  in  wage  growth  between  high-
migration and low-migration states that is associated with emigration.  There are several 
reasons why we might be reluctant to assign a causal interpretation to the parametric 
results, which I discuss in the concluding section. 
  Finally, the analysis doesn’t address changes in the distribution of unobservables.  
If,  holding  observed  characteristics  constant,  Mexican  emigrants  have  low  (high) 
unobserved ability relative to non-migrants in Mexico, I would tend to understate the 
extent to which migrants are negatively (positively) selected in terms of skill. 
 
4.1  Estimating Counterfactual Earnings Densities 
Let f(w|x,i,t) be the density of hourly labor earnings, w, conditional on a set of 
observed  characteristics,  x,  in  region  i  and  time  t.    Define  h(x|i,t)  as  the  density  of 
observed characteristics among wage earners in region i and time t.  For regions, i=H 
indicates high-migration states and i=L indicates low-migration states; for time periods, 
t=00 indicates the year 2000 and t=90 indicates the year 1990.  The observed density of 
labor earnings for individuals in region i at time t is, 
      ￿ = dx ) t , i | x ( h ) t , i , x | w ( f ) t , i | w ( g        
Differences in  ) t , H , x | w ( f  and  ) t , L , x | w ( f  reflect differences in returns to observables 
in high and low-migration states; differences in h(x|H,t) and h(x|L,t) reflect differences in 
the distribution of observables in high and low-migration states.  The empirical analysis 
examines how regional differences in these two sets of densities changed over the 1990s. 
  In the first exercise, I compare the composition of the labor force across regions.  
I ask how the difference in earnings densities between high and low-migration states   20 
changes over time, holding constant returns to observables such that only the distribution 
of observables varies across regions and years.  The first decomposition I consider is how 
the wage density differs between high-migration and low-migration states in 1990 for a 
common set of returns to observable characteristics: 
    ￿ ￿ - dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f .   (1)  
The density difference in equation (1) evaluates the difference in the earnings distribution 
in high and low-migration states in 1990, fixing the returns to observables to be that in 
low-migration states in 1990.  This density difference characterizes the initial difference 
in  the  distribution  of  observables  between  high  and  low-migration  states.    Applying 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL), I rewrite (1) as  
      ￿ - q ® dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f ] 1 [ 90 H 90 L ,    (2)  
where 
       
) 90 , L | x ( h
) 90 , H | x ( h 90 H 90 L = q ® .        (3)  
Equation (2) is simply the observed marginal earnings density in low-migration states in 
1990, adjusted by a weighting function.  Given an estimate of the weighting function in 
(3),  it  would  be  straightforward  to  apply  a  kernel  density  estimator  to  equation  (2).  
Following  DFL,  I  estimate  the  weighting  function  in  (3)  by  running  a  logit  on  the 
probability  a  Mexican  male  is  from  a  low-migration  state  in  1990  for  the  sample  of 
Mexican males from high-migration and low-migration states in 1990. 
    Consider  the  analogue  to  equation  (2)  for  2000.    The  2000  difference  in  the 
earnings distribution in high and low-migration states that is associated with differences 
in the distribution of observable characteristics can be written as    21 
    ￿ ￿ - dx ) 00 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 00 , H | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f .  (4)  
Using weighting functions analogous to (3), I rewrite equation (4) as 
    ￿
® ® q - q dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f ] [ 00 L 90 L 00 H 90 L .    (5)  
Putting  (2)  together  with  (5),  we  have  the  1990-to-2000  change  in  the  earnings 
distribution in high-migration versus low-migration states that is associated with changes 
in the distribution of observables:  
    
( )
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( ) ( ) ￿
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￿ ￿
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- -
® ® ® dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f 1
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dx ) 00 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 00 , H | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f
90 H 90 L 00 L 90 L 00 H 90 L
.  (6) 
Equation (6) shows the difference in the earnings distribution in high-migration versus 
low-migration states in 2000, relative to that in 1990, holding the returns to observables 
constant.  Since an individual’s birth state is fixed, I can use (6) to evaluate changes in 
labor-force composition in high-migration versus low-migration states, where I evaluate 
workers based on their place in the 1990 earnings distribution in low-migration states.  
To  perform  this  exercise,  I  estimate  a  series  of  logit  regressions  to  construct  the 
weighting functions and then apply the weights to a kernel density estimator to obtain 
estimates for the densities described by (2), (5), and (6).  The first two of these are for a 
single difference in densities and the third is for a double difference in densities. 
  The  second  exercise  I  perform  is  to  examine  how  the  returns  to  observable 
characteristics have changed in high and low-migration states, holding the distribution of 
characteristics constant.  For 1990 the difference in earnings densities we’d like to see is 
    ￿ ￿ - dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f .   (7)    22 
which evaluates the difference in earnings distributions in high and low-migration states 
in 1990, fixing the marginal density of observables to be that in low-migration states in 
1990.  Following the logic of DFL, I rewrite equation (7) as  
      ￿ - l ® dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f ] 1 [ 90 H 90 L ,    (8)  
where 
       
) 90 , L , x | w ( f
) 90 , H , x | w ( f 90 H 90 L = l ® .       (9)  
The corresponding difference in densities for 2000 is 
    ￿ ￿ - dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 00 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 00 , H , x | w ( f ,  (10)  
which evaluates the difference in earnings distribution between high and low-migration 
states  in  2000,  again  fixing  the  marginal  density  of  observables  to  be  that  in  low-
migration states in 1990.  Using the weights, 
      
) 90 , L , x | w ( f
) 00 , L , x | w ( f
and
) 90 , L , x | w ( f
) 00 , H , x | w ( f 00 L 90 L 00 H 90 L = l = l ® ® ,   (11) 
I rewrite equation (10) as 
    ￿
® ® l - l dx ) 90 , L | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f ] [ 00 L 90 L 00 H 90 L .    (12)  
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.  (13) 
Equation (13) shows the 1990-to-2000 change in earnings distribution in high-migration 
states relative to low-migration states, holding the distribution of observables constant.    23 
This is the component of the change in relative regional earnings densities associated 
with changes in relative regional returns to observable characteristics alone. 
  To estimate the weighting functions in (9) and (11), I use Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, 
and McCrary’s (2004) extension of DFL.  As they show, applying Bayes’ Axiom yields  
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.    (14) 
Each weighting function in (14) is the product of odds ratios.  In the first weight, the first 
ratio is the odds an individual is from a low-migration state in 2000 (based on a sample of 
individuals from low-migration states in 1990 and 2000), conditional on observables, x, 
and earnings, w; and the second ratio is the (inverse) odds an individual is from a low-
migration state in 2000, conditional on just on x.  To estimate the odds ratios, I estimate 
two logit models.  In each case, the regressand is a 0-1 variable on the outcome i=L and 
t=00 (based on a sample of (i=L, t=00) and (i=L, t=90)).  For the first logit, the regressors 
are x and w; for the second, the regressor is x, alone.  Other weights can be estimated 
analogously.  After constructing the weights, I estimate (8), (12), and (13). 
 
4.2  A Parametric Approach 
  To  evaluate  the  association  between  emigration  and  earnings  parametrically,  I 
pool data on working age men in 1990 and 2000 from high-migration or low-migration 
states and estimate the following difference-in-difference wage regression,   24 
hst hs ht hs 3 ht 2 1 hst s hst High * 2000 Y * ) High 2000 Y ( X w ln e + f + b + b + b + a =  
                      (15) 
where w is average hourly earnings, X is a vector of observed characteristics, Y2000 is a 
dummy  variable  for  the  year  2000,  and  High  is  a  dummy  variable  for  whether  an 
individual was born in a high-migration state.  The regression includes controls for state-
of-birth  fixed  effects  and  allows  returns  to  observable  characteristics  to  vary  across 
regions and time.  The coefficient, ￿, captures the mean differential 1990-to-2000 change 
in earnings between high and low-migration states.
13 
  One important estimation issue is that shocks other than emigration may have had 
differential impacts on high and low-migration states.  I’ve already discussed the shock 
associated with NAFTA and other aspects of trade liberalization.  Another shock was the 
peso crisis of 1995.  After a bungled devaluation of the peso in 1994, Mexico chose to 
float  its  currency,  which  proceeded  to  plummet  in  value  relative  to  the  dollar.    The 
ensuing  increase  in  the  peso  value  of  dollar-denominated  liabilities  contributed  to  a 
banking collapse and a severe economic contraction.  Low-migration states (excluding 
Mexico City) are modestly less industrialized than high-migration states and so may have 
been less hurt by the credit crunch.  Also, low-migration states tend to have larger tourist 
industries, which may have benefited from the devaluation.  Other shocks in the 1990’s 
included a reform of Mexico’s land tenure system in 1992, the privatization of state-
owned enterprises, and industry deregulation.  The existence of these shocks leaves the 
                                                 
13 Equation (15) is a standard difference-in-difference specification, which implies I estimate the mean 
differential in wage growth between high and low-migration states.  This approach ignores the possibility 
that  the  wage  effect  of  being  in  a  high-migration  state  may  not  be  uniform  throughout  the  wage 
distribution.  A more elegant approach would be to estimate the regional differential in wage changes non-
parametrically, as in the framework derived by Athey and Imbens (2003).   25 
results subject to the caveat that factors other than emigration may have contributed to 
differential regional changes in earnings.  I return to this issue in section 5. 
 
4.3  Empirical Results 
  The sample for the analysis is the cohort of Mexican men aged 20 to 49 years in 
1990 or 30 to 59 years in 2000 who were born in one of the seven high-migration states 
or one of the seven low-migration states.  By restricting the analysis to a single cohort, I 
limit  possible  contamination  of  the  sample  associated  with  more-educated  younger 
workers entering the labor force and less-educated older workers exiting the labor force.  
The dependent variable is log average hourly labor earnings (see note 10). 
Figure 12 shows kernel density estimates for the density differences in equations 
(2) and (5), which characterize the difference in earning distributions between high and 
low-migration states holding constant the return to observable characteristics.  In 1990 
and 2000, the density difference has negative mass above the mean and positive mass 
below the sample mean (where the mean over the entire sample of states is normalized to 
zero).  This implies that in either year there are relatively few men from high-migration 
states with above-average earnings and relatively many men from high-migration states 
with below-average earnings.  Whatever the source of this initial difference, it becomes 
modestly  more  pronounced  during  the  1990s.    Between  1990  and  2000,  the  density 
difference loses mass above the mean and gains mass below the mean.  Compared to low-
migration states, it appears that men with above-average earnings from high-migration 
states disappear from the sample in larger numbers. 
The change in the composition of the labor force is perhaps seen more clearly in 
Figure 13, which shows the 1990-to-2000 change in the difference in earnings densities   26 
between high-migration and low-migration states (for constant returns to observables).  
This (partial) double difference shows negative mass above the mean and positive mass 
below the mean, indicating that over time the relative scarcity of high-wage workers has 
increased in high-migration states relative to low-migration states.   
Comparing units on the vertical axes in Figures 11 and 13, it is apparent that the 
counterfactual  double  difference  in  wage  densities  is  small,  but it  is  still  informative 
about the nature of migrant selection on observables.  Figure 7 shows that between 1990 
and 2000 there was a relatively large loss in the population of working-age men born in 
high-migration  states,  which  is  consistent  with individuals  from  high-migration states 
having a relatively high propensity to migrate abroad.  What Figures 12 and 13 suggest is 
that  the  men  most  likely  to  migrate  abroad  are  those  in  the  top  half  of  the  earnings 
distribution.  This finding is inconsistent with negative selection of emigrants in terms of 
observable skills and suggests that emigrants exhibit intermediate or positive selection in 
terms  of  observable  skills.    Using  data  from  Mexican  and  U.S.  population  censuses, 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) also find evidence against negative selection.
14 
One  might  also  be  concerned  that  including  the  relatively  rich  and  globalized 
regions of the Federal District and Jalisco in the sample of birth states affects the results.  
In Figure 14, I show the double difference in counterfactual wage densities reported in 
Figure 13 (with returns to observables fixed at those for low-migration states in 1990) for 
a sample that excludes the two states.  Comparing Figures 13 and 14 shows that results 
are similar with or without these states in the sample.  The results are also robust to 
dropping any one of the other states from the sample. 
                                                 
14 Results are similar if I evaluate change in earnings densities between high-migration and low-migration 
states for returns to observables fixed at those for high (rather than low) migration states in 1990.   27 
Over time, it appears that men born in high-migration states are emigrating from 
Mexico in relatively large numbers and that the emigrants include a disproportionately 
large number of individuals with relatively high earnings potential.  In a simple labor-
supply,  labor-demand  framework,  a  decrease  in  the  relative  supply  of  more-skilled 
workers in high-migration states would put upward pressure on relative wages in these 
states (as long as labor was not perfectly mobile between regions of Mexico).  Next, we 
examine how relative regional returns to observables have changed over time. 
Figure 15 shows kernel density estimates for the density differences in (8) and 
(12), which characterize the difference in earning distributions between high and low-
migration states holding constant the distribution of observable characteristics.  In 1990 
and 2000, the density difference has positive mass above the mean and negative mass 
below  the  mean.    In  either  year,  returns  to  observables  appear  to  be  higher  in high-
migration  states  relative  to  low-migration  states.    Although  one  cannot  identify  from 
Figure 15 the source of the initial difference in relative regional earnings, relatively high 
returns to observables in high-migration states is consistent with the relative scarcity of 
high-wage workers in high-migration states evident in Figure 12.   
Over  time,  the  difference  in  returns  to  observables  between  high  and  low-
migration states appears to have become more pronounced.  Figure 15 shows that from 
1990 to 2000 the difference in wage densities between high-migration and low-migration 
states gains mass above the mean and loses mass below the mean.  This is seen more 
clearly in Figure 16, which shows the 1990-to-2000 change in the difference in earnings 
densities  between  high-migration  and  low-migration  states,  holding  constant  the 
distribution of observables.  This double difference shows positive mass above the mean   28 
and negative mass below the mean, indicating that during the 1990’s the wage premium 
for above-average wage earners increased for men born in high-migration states relative 
to  men  born  in  low-migration  states.    Though  the  partial  double  difference  in  wage 
densities is again small (compare to Figure 11),
15 the increase in the relative wage for 
men born in high-migration states evident in Figure 17 is consistent with the decrease in 
the  relative  supply  of  men  born  in  high-migration  states  evident  in  Figure  13.    In 
unreported density estimates, I obtain similar results when I drop men born in the Federal 
District or Jalisco from the sample. 
  The non-parametric results suggest there has been an increase in relative wages 
for men born in high-migration states in Mexico.  To evaluate the change in regional 
relative wages parametrically, Table 8 shows estimation results for equation (15).  The 
dependent variable is log average hourly earnings.  The regressors are dummy variables 
for educational attainment, a quadratic in age, a dummy variable for the year 2000 and its 
interaction with the age and education variables, a dummy variable for having been born 
in a high-migration state and its interaction with the age and education variables, dummy 
variables for birth state, and the interaction of the year 2000 and high-migration dummy 
variables.  This last variable captures the differential change in wage growth in high-
migration  states  relative  to  low-migration  states.    Standard  errors  are  adjusted  for 
correlation across observations associated with the same birth state. 
  Panel (a) of Table 8 shows that during the 1990’s the cohort of men born in high-
migration  states  enjoyed  labor  earnings  growth  that  was  6.3  log  points  higher  than 
                                                 
15 Since both counterfactual double differences in densities are small, it appears that the interaction between 
changes in worker characteristics and changes in returns to characteristics accounts for a large portion of 
the total change in regional relative wages.  However, the double differences in wage densities still appear 
to be informative about the direction of these changes.  Relative regional wage changes appear to be larger 
where relative regional labor-supply changes are larger.   29 
earnings  growth  for  individuals  born  in  low-migration  states.    These  coefficients  are 
precisely  estimated.    This  is  consistent  with  the  non-parametric  estimates  and  again 
suggests that men born in high-migration states enjoyed higher growth in labor earnings 
than men born in low-migration states.  The second two columns of Table 8 show results 
where  the  year2000/high-migration  interaction  is  interacted  with  an  indicator  for  an 
individual  having  9  to  15  years  of  education  (roughly,  workers  with  above  mean 
schooling  years  but  with  less  than  a  college  education).    This  term  allows  relative 
earnings growth to be larger for more-educated workers.  The education interaction term 
is positive, consistent with Figure 17 (while the variable appears imprecisely estimated 
the two reported interaction terms are jointly highly statistically significant).
16 
  Panel (b) of Table 8 redoes the estimation, dropping observations for the Federal 
District and Jalisco.  Estimated relative wage growth for high-migration states is higher 
for this sample, with men born in high-migration states enjoying labor earnings growth 
8.6 to 8.9 log points higher than for men born in low-migration states.  In the second two 
columns, the interaction between the year2000/high-migration interaction and the dummy 
variable for secondary education is again positive (and the two interaction terms are again 
jointly highly statistically significant). 
  Since emigration rates are highest for individuals in their twenties, one might 
expect that wage changes between high-migration and low-migration states would have 
been largest for men who are more educated and young.  In unreported results, I included 
additional interactions between the year 2000 dummy, secondary education, and age, but 
these proved to be imprecisely estimated in most regressions. 
                                                 
16 Introducing interaction terms for more disaggregated schooling categories yields similar results.   30 
  Based on the coefficient estimates, it is possible to construct an elasticity of the 
relative wage for high-migration and low-migration states with respect to the relative 
labor supply in high-migration and low-migration states.  From Figure 6, the supply of 
working-age men in high-migration states fell by 9.8 log points relative to the supply of 
working-age  men  in  the  same  cohort  in  low-migration  states.    This  implies  a  wage 
elasticity of 0.64.  Excluding the Federal District and Jalisco the wage elasticity is 0.91.  
Either elasticity is larger than the value of 0.4 that Mishra (2004) estimates using data on 
changes  in  wages  and  labor  supply  for  age-schooling  cohorts  at  the  national  level.  
Recall, however, that my estimates are reduced form.  They include the direct effect of 
emigration  on  wages  (through  changes  in  the  labor  supply),  and  any  indirect  effect 
associated  with  differential  labor-demand  growth  in  high-migration  states  that  is 
associated  with  historical  emigration  patterns.    Comparing  my  results  to  Mishra’s 
suggests that the indirect effects of emigration on regional wages are positive. 
 
5.  Discussion 
  In this paper, I examine how emigration may have affected regional labor supply 
and regional earnings in Mexico.  Mexico has a long history of sending migrants to the 
United States.  Since the early 1900s, emigration rates have varied widely across regions 
of the country, with individuals from west-central states having the highest propensity to 
migrate abroad.  I exploit regional persistence in emigration behavior by focusing the 
analysis on individuals  born in states with a history of  either high-migration or low-
migration to the United States, as measured by state emigration rates in the 1950s. 
  As  in  earlier  decades,  during  the  1990s  individuals  born  in  Mexico’s  high-
migration  states  appeared  to  have  a  relatively  high  propensity  to  migrate  abroad.    31 
Between 1990 and 2000, the population of 20-59 year-old men born in high-migration 
states declined by 10 log points relative to similarly aged men born in low-migration 
states.  For women, the corresponding relative regional change in population was 8 log 
points.    The  relatively  large  exodus  of  individuals  from  high-migration  states  is 
concentrated among individuals with above-average earnings potential.  This suggests 
that  in  terms  of  observable  skills  emigrants  are  positively  selected.    Controlling  for 
observables, wages in high-migration states rose relative to low-migration states by 6-
9%.  This implies an elasticity of wages with respect to the labor supply of 0.7-0.8.  This 
change reflects both the direct effects of emigration on the labor supply and any indirect 
effects of historical emigration patterns on current regional wage growth. 
  There are several possible interpretations of these results.  One is that emigration 
raises wages in Mexico, with the effects being most pronounced in states that have well-
developed networks  for sending migrants to the United States.  This interpretation is 
consistent with the findings in Munshi (2003), Hanson (2004), and Mishra (2004). 
  However, emigration was by no means the only shock to the Mexican economy 
during  the  1990’s.    Other  shocks  may  have  also  contributed  to  changes  in  regional 
relative  wages.    A  large  literature  documents  how  NAFTA  and  other  aspects  of 
globalization appear to have increased regional wage differentials in Mexico.  It is not 
clear how globalization interacts with emigration.  States more exposed to globalization 
appear to have lower migration rates to the United States, suggesting that emigration and 
globalization may be complementary mechanisms for integrating Mexico into the North 
American labor market. Another important shock was the Mexican peso crisis in 1995.  
This may have hurt high-migration states more than low-migration states (since high-  32 
migration states have larger industrial bases and smaller tourist industries), suggesting my 
estimates may understate the true effect of emigration on regional wages. 
  Other  policy  changes,  such  as  the  privatization  and  deregulation  of  Mexican 
industry or the reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system, may also have had differential 
regional impacts.  Privatization and deregulation appeared to lower union wage premiums 
in these sectors (Fairris, 2003).  Since more heavily unionized industries are concentrated 
in Mexico’s north and center and relatively absent in Mexico’s south (Chiquiar, 2003), 
we  might  expect  a  loss  in  union  power  to  lower  relative  wages  in  Mexico’s  high-
migration states, in which case my results would tend to understate the true effect of 
emigration.  The reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system allowed the sale of agricultural 
land  that  had  previously  been  held  in  cooperative  ownership.    We  might  expect  this 
change  to  have  raised  relative  incomes  in  southern  Mexico,  which  specializes  in 
agriculture.    Since  low-migration  states  are  concentrated  in  southern  Mexico,  this  is 
another reason my results may tend to understate the true effect of emigration. 
A  brief  review  of  Mexico’s  other  policy  reforms  during  the  1990’s  does  not 
suggest any obvious reason why they should account for the observed increase in relative 
earnings in high-migration states.  Still, in an environment where multiple shocks have 
affected Mexico’s labor market it is important to be cautious about ascribing shifts in 
relative regional earnings to any specific event.  In the end, we can only say that I find 
suggestive evidence that emigration has increased relative earnings in Mexican states that 
have stronger migration networks vis-à-vis the United States.   33 
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 Table 1:  Share of U.S. Immigrants from Mexico in the Population of Mexico 
(percent) 
               
    Males    Females   
Age Cohort  % Residing in U.S.    % Residing in U.S.   
Age in 1990  Age in 2000  1990  2000  Change  1990  2000  Change 
               
--  16 to 25  --  11.99  --  --  7.68  -- 
               
16 to 25  26 to 35  7.57  17.53  9.96  4.89  12.62  7.73 
               
26 to 35  36 to 45  10.87  15.49  4.62  7.69  11.90  4.21 
               
36 to45  46 to 55  9.18  12.21  3.03  7.47  10.44  2.97 
               
46 to 55  56 to 65  7.00  8.64  1.64  6.44  8.36  1.92 
               
56 to 65  --  5.70  --  --  5.84  --  -- 
                       
 
This table shows Mexican immigrants in the U.S. as a percentage of the population of 
individuals born in Mexico (equal to the sum of the Mexico-born population residing in 
Mexico and the Mexico-born population residing in the United States) by age and sex 
categories.  The sample is individuals 16-65 years old (in the U.S., excluding those in 
group quarters; in Mexico, excluding those not born in the country).  Residents of Mexico 
in 1990 are the 1% microsample of the XII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 
1990, and in 2000 are a 10% random sample of the 10% microsample of the XIII Censo 
General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 2000.  Mexican immigrants are from the 1990 and 
2000 5% U.S. Public Use Microsample.  Source:  Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). 
 Table 2:  Emigration and Characteristics of Mexican States 
 
   Migration to U.S. 1995-2000  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  0.231  0.169  0.211  0.175 
  (0.085)  (0.085)  (0.098)  (0.077) 
         
Log Per Capita  -0.025  -0.036  -0.03  -0.017 
GDP in 1995  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
         
Log Distance    0.070  0.006  -0.025 
to U.S.    (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
         
Log Distance    -0.007  0.000  0.003 
to U.S.
2    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
         
Migration Rate      32.813  4.295 
1924      (10.210)  (10.210) 
         
Migration Rate        1.919 
1955-59        (0.386) 
         
Adjusted R
2  0.116  0.252  0.456  0.667 
N  32  32  32  32 
 
The sample is the 31 states of Mexico plus the Federal District.  The dependent variable is the 
average share of households in a state that had sent a migrant to the United States in the 1995-
2000 period.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3:  Correlation in Measures of Exposures to Globalization across Mexican States 
 
         
        Share of State 
  Maquiladora  Foreign Direct    Population 
  Value Added/  Investment/  Imports/   Migrating to US, 
   State GDP  State GDP  State GDP  1995-2000 
         
Foreign Direct Investment/  0.391       
State GDP  (0.027)       
         
Imports/  -0.007  0.571     
State GDP  (0.968)  (0.001)     
         
Share of State Population  -0.128  -0.368  -0.253   
Migrating to US, 1995-2000  (0.484)  (0.038)  (0.162)   
         
Share of State Population  0.188  -0.123  -0.133  0.725 
Migrating to US, 1955-1959  (0.303)  (0.502)  (0.468)  (0.000) 
 
The  sample  is  the  31  states  of  Mexico  plus  the  Federal  District.    Shares  of  state  GDP 
(maquiladora value added, foreign direct investment, imports) are averages over the period 1993-
1999.  Correlations are weighted by state share of the national population (averaged over 1990 to 
2000).  P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 4:  Ranking Mexican States by Historical Emigration Rates 
           
  Migration Rate  Per Capita  Pop. 2000 
State  1995-2000  1955-1959  GDP 1995  (' 000s) 
           
High  Aguascalientes  0.090  0.032  1,728  952 
Migration  Durango  0.093  0.055  1,329  1,440 
  Guanajuato  0.114  0.041  1,062  4,604 
  Michoacán  0.130  0.031  901  3,921 
  San Luis Potosí  0.087  0.025  1,094  2,362 
  Zacatecas  0.151  0.059  878  1,348 
  Jalisco  0.082  0.020  1,479  6,272 
           
  Mean  0.104  0.033  1,197  2,986 
   Mean w/o Jalisco  0.114  0.038  1,077  2,438 
           
Low  Campeche  0.011  0.000  2,341  680 
Migration  Chiapas  0.009  0.000  678  3,877 
  Quintana Roo  0.009  0.000  2,437  876 
  Tabasco  0.007  0.002  951  1,911 
  Veracruz  0.037  0.000  912  6,923 
  Yucatán  0.013  0.002  1,159  1,646 
  Federal District  0.021  0.001  3,823  8,544 
           
  Mean  0.021  0.001  2,006  3,494 
   Mean w/o Fed. Dis.  0.021  0.001  1,030  2,652 
           
Other Non-Border States (12)  0.049  0.007  1,096  2,925 
           
Border States (6)  0.032  0.020  2,054  2,759 
           
This table shows rates of migration to the United States, per capita GDP, and population for 
Mexican states.  Means are weighted by the 2000 population of the subgroup. 
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Table 5:  Probability of Internal Migration 
 
  (a) All High-Migration and Low-Migration States 
    Moved since Birth 
    Men  Women 
     (1)  (2) 
  Year 2000*High Migration  0.034  0.041 
    (0.014)  (0.130) 
       
  R   0.068  0.060 
  N  159,067  174,052 
       
  (b) Excluding the Federal District and Jalisco 
    Moved since Birth 
    Men  Women 
     (3)  (4) 
  Year 2000*High Migration  0.016  0.021 
    (0.010)  (0.007) 
       
  R   0.077  0.066 
  N  107,310  116,864 
 
This table reports results for probit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if an 
individual resides in a different state than his/her birth state and zero otherwise.  The sample is 
men and women in Mexico aged 20-49 in 1990 or 30-59 in 2000 born in a high-migration or a 
low-migration Mexican state.  The other regressors are:  (a) a cubic in age, dummy variables for 
five categories of educational attainment (1-5 years, 6-8 years, 9-11 years, 12-15 years, or 16+ 
years), a dummy variable for marital status, dummy variables for presence of children in the 
household (ages 0-5, 6-12, or 13-18 years), dummy variables for the state of birth, and a dummy 
variable  for  the  year  2000;  (b)  interactions  between  the  age,  education,  marital  status,  and 
children variables and the year 2000 dummy; and (c) interactions between the age, education, 
marital status, and children variables and a dummy variable for whether the individual was born 
in  a  high-migration  state.    The  coefficients  show  the  change  in  the  probability  of  internal 
migration associated with an individual being from a high-migration state in 2000 versus that in 
1990 (evaluated at mean values for other regressors).  Standard errors (corrected for correlation 
in the errors within birth states) are in parentheses. 
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Table 6:  Schooling by Age Cohort in High-Migration and Low-Migration States, 2000 
 
  State  2000             
  Migration  Age     Years of Schooling       
Sex  Rate  Cohort  0  1-5  6-8  9-11  12-15  16+ 
                 
Men  Low  30-39  0.042  0.131  0.201  0.262  0.200  0.164 
  Low  40-49  0.064  0.192  0.241  0.174  0.145  0.184 
  Low  50-59  0.119  0.289  0.240  0.124  0.097  0.132 
                 
  High  30-39  0.046  0.200  0.277  0.238  0.135  0.104 
  High  40-49  0.084  0.283  0.290  0.142  0.084  0.118 
  High  50-59  0.169  0.377  0.236  0.089  0.054  0.074 
                 
Excluding  Low  30-39  0.072  0.220  0.238  0.218  0.147  0.104 
Federal District  Low  40-49  0.108  0.307  0.253  0.127  0.089  0.116 
& Jalisco  Low  50-59  0.182  0.404  0.213  0.075  0.056  0.070 
                 
  High  30-39  0.052  0.215  0.274  0.233  0.129  0.097 
  High  40-49  0.090  0.292  0.288  0.142  0.082  0.106 
   High  50-59  0.174  0.386  0.235  0.089  0.050  0.065 
                 
Women  Low  30-39  0.064  0.155  0.205  0.237  0.210  0.128 
  Low  40-49  0.105  0.227  0.255  0.162  0.156  0.095 
  Low  50-59  0.197  0.278  0.238  0.125  0.113  0.050 
                 
  High  30-39  0.052  0.220  0.302  0.217  0.141  0.069 
  High  40-49  0.103  0.350  0.292  0.122  0.083  0.050 
  High  50-59  0.203  0.407  0.232  0.086  0.054  0.019 
                 
Excluding  Low  30-39  0.113  0.261  0.225  0.186  0.131  0.084 
Federal District  Low  40-49  0.177  0.353  0.231  0.105  0.076  0.057 
& Jalisco  Low  50-59  0.301  0.367  0.195  0.067  0.048  0.022 
                 
  High  30-39  0.060  0.236  0.298  0.205  0.135  0.066 
  High  40-49  0.113  0.364  0.283  0.116  0.079  0.044 
   High  50-59  0.218  0.414  0.216  0.083  0.052  0.017 
 
This table shows the distribution of educational attainment by age cohort for individuals 30-59 years old 
in 2000 born in high-migration or low-migration Mexican states (based on 1955-1959 emigration rates).   42 
Table 7:  Average Hourly Wages by Age and Schooling Cohort, 1990 and 2000 
  State  2000             
  Migration  Age     Years of Schooling    
Year  Rate  Cohort  0  1-5  6-8  9-11  12-15  16+ 
                 
1990  Low  30-39  0.92  1.62  1.56  2.14  2.76  4.61 
1990  Low  40-49  1.21  1.31  2.56  2.97  4.25  6.30 
1990  Low  50-59  1.27  1.83  2.49  3.88  6.10  8.10 
                 
1990  High  30-39  1.41  1.77  1.76  2.77  2.80  5.00 
1990  High  40-49  1.58  2.87  3.00  3.00  3.67  5.55 
1990  High  50-59  1.53  1.93  2.55  3.80  4.76  7.13 
                 
2000  Low  30-39  0.61  1.06  1.19  1.50  2.59  5.11 
2000  Low  40-49  0.54  0.70  1.31  1.84  3.25  6.19 
2000  Low  50-59  0.60  0.85  1.57  1.89  3.56  6.97 
                 
2000  High  30-39  1.18  2.63  1.44  2.39  2.72  4.39 
2000  High  40-49  1.21  1.22  2.05  2.02  3.51  5.12 
2000  High  50-59  0.98  2.56  1.97  2.65  3.69  6.50 
                 
      Excluding the Federal District & Jalisco 
1990  Low  30-39  0.83  1.05  1.26  1.96  2.34  3.27 
1990  Low  40-49  1.14  1.25  1.71  2.01  3.21  4.22 
1990  Low  50-59  1.22  1.60  2.41  3.11  4.86  5.70 
                 
1990  High  30-39  1.31  1.74  1.68  1.75  2.80  4.36 
1990  High  40-49  1.41  2.96  3.22  3.00  3.44  4.85 
1990  High  50-59  1.49  1.64  2.43  3.96  4.47  6.71 
                 
2000  Low  30-39  0.56  1.05  1.06  1.23  2.28  3.79 
2000  Low  40-49  0.51  0.63  1.11  1.70  2.64  5.54 
2000  Low  50-59  0.56  0.79  1.29  1.75  3.20  5.88 
                 
2000  High  30-39  1.19  2.98  1.39  2.55  2.58  4.30 
2000  High  40-49  1.10  1.11  2.19  1.86  3.13  4.96 
2000  High  50-59  0.82  2.47  1.62  2.47  3.54  6.66 
 
This table shows average hourly wages by age and schooling cohort for individuals aged 20-49 in 1990 or 
30-59 in 2000 born in a high-migration or a low-migration state.  Wage levels are in 2000 U.S. dollars for 
men with average hourly earnings between $0.05 and $20.  See note 10 on how wages are constructed.   43 
Table 8:  Regression Results 
 
    Workers w/    Workers w/ 
  All  20-80 Hour  All  20-80 Hour 
   Workers  Work Week  Workers  Work Week 
         
  (a) Full Sample of Workers   
         
Year 2000*High Migration  0.063  0.063  0.045  0.049 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
         
Year 2000*High Migration*      0.057  0.043 
9-15 Years of Education      (0.030)  (0.030) 
         
R  0.308  0.349  0.308  0.349 
N  110,837  103,232  110,837  103,232 
              
         
  (b) Excluding the Federal District and Jalisco 
         
Year 2000*High Migration  0.089  0.086  0.066  0.066 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
         
Year 2000*High Migration*      0.084  0.065 
9-15 Years of Education      (0.046)  (0.048) 
         
R  0.261  0.302  0.261  0.303 
N  71,557  66,152  71,557  66,152 
 
The dependent variable is log average hourly labor earnings.  In columns 1 and 3, the sample is 
males born in a high-migration state or a low-migration state; in columns 2 and 4, the sample 
includes males who report working 20-80 hours a week.  Other regressors (quadratic in age, 
dummies for year of education, and their interactions with year 2000 dummy and with High 
Migration dummy; year 2000 dummy variable; state dummy variables) are not shown.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for correlation across observations within birth states.  
In panel (a), the sample is working males in all high and low-migration states and time periods; 
in panel (b), I drop observations for the Federal District and Jalisco from the sample. 
 





















































Figure 1:  Share of Population Born in Mexico Residing in the U.S. 
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Share of Residents Migrating to US, 1955-1959






































Figure 3:  State Rates of Migration to the U.S. in 1990s versus 1950s 
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Import Share of GDP, 1993-99





































































FDI Share of GDP, 1994-99










































Figure 6:   







































































Low High Low High Low High





Figure 7:   
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Figure 8:   
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Figure 9:  Kernel Densities for Average Log Hourly Wages, 1990 and 2000 
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Figure 10:  Kernel Densities for Log Wages, Excluding Federal District and Jalisco   52 
 
(a) Full Sample 
 
 
(b) Excluding the Federal District and Jalisco 
 
Figure 11:  1990 to 2000 Change in Wage Densities  
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Figure 12:  Differences in Counterfactual Wage Densities  
between High-Migration and Low-Migration States  
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Figure 13:  Double Difference in Counterfactual Wage Densities  
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Figure 14:  Double Difference in Wage Densities, Excluding Federal District and Jalisco  
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Figure 15:  Differences in Counterfactual Wage Densities  
between High-Migration and Low-Migration States  
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Figure 16:  Double Difference in Counterfactual Wage Densities  
(with distribution of observable characteristics evaluated for low-migration states in 1990) 